ABSTRACT Mobile sensing receives lots of attention since it exploits sensors embedded in smartphones to gather information for quality improvement of daily life. In particular, mobile users (MUs) carrying smartphones act as queriers who request information provided by MUs who act as data collectors, and the data collection and delivery are facilitated by human mobility and ubiquity. However, additional privacy considerations rise in this paradigm, where MUs might not want to reveal their identities when providing some information at a specific position during a particular period. By adopting group signature, where any member of its group can sign a message on behalf of the entire group, the signer of the sensed information cannot be recognized, and thus, anonymity is preserved. The concept of group signature can be realized when introducing mobile edge computing, where base stations are clustered into a region to serve a group of MUs. In such region-based group signature, MUs located in the same region are grouped and thus are indistinguishable. Due to the localized movement feature of human, MUs might not frequently leave the current group and join a new group, which subsequently reduces the infamous rekeying overhead. We implement group signature on Android smartphones and conduct simulation experiments to investigate the performance of the proposed region-based grouping approach from the perspectives of rekeying overhead and delay. The simulation results show that the region-based grouping method is efficient. Moreover, the optimal group number for the minimization of rekeying overhead is suggested.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last two decades, sensor network received growing interests since it explores the ways to collect and use information from the physical world. With sensing, processing, and communication capabilities, the networked sensor nodes cooperatively collect information on entities of interest, such as temperature, pressure, humidity, or location of objects. The sensed results are sent over a wireless medium to a remote static sink, where they are fused and analyzed to determine the global status of the sensed area. Recently, by exploiting the rich set of embedded sensors (such as cameras, gyroscope, GPS, accelerometer, light sensor and digital compass) on mobile devices (such as smartphones, wearable devices, and smart vehicles) as the sensor nodes, a new Internet of Things (IoT) paradigm is realized, known as mobile sensing [1] - [3] . It expands the capabilities of traditional sensing applications by using rechargeable batteries, leveraging cellular infrastructure, as well as taking full advantages of human mobility and ubiquity. By further recognizing, processing, and distributing human activity and interaction, various kinds of attractive applications are enabled [4] , [5] .
With mobile sensing, people share and distribute sensed information via physical proximity or social relations over the mobile devices. A mobile user (MU) plays the roles of both querier and collector who respectively request and provide information. When more collectors provide independent and unbiased feedback, the wisdom of crowds becomes more effective, and thus quality of feedback to querier is improved, which encourages people to participate mobile sensing. However, unlike traditional IoT applications where sensors collect surrounding information on a fixed location, sensors carried by participants in mobile sensing will retrieive personal information related to human activity, which introduce the concern of privacy [6] - [8] . As a result, it is critical to design an approach for sharing personal information in an anonymous fashion.
This issue has been widely discussed in [6] and [9] - [19] . Typically, the anonymity is achieved by making the queriers who request the same contents, have same attributes or locate in the same region indistinguishable. We classify the privacypreserving solutions with a novel taxonomy from the dimensions of domain of ambiguity and technique for ambiguity. Among these solutions, group signature [20] , [21] receives lots of attentions due to its intuitivity and flexibility. The rationale of group signature is that any member of its group can sign a document on behalf of the entire group, and thus the anonymity is achieved. Moreover, when a signature disputes, the group manager can efficiently find out the identity of the group member who has signed it. It is important since unbiased feedback should be eliminated to improve the reliability of information provided by the mobile sensing application, which significantly increases the incentive of participants [3] . Each time an existing member leaves the group, all the group members need to change the new shared key so that the signature of the departed user does not belong to the group, which is known as rekeying procedure.
In the existing solutions applying group signature such as AnonySense [9] , [11] , the collectors who have the same attribute will be assigned to the same group, which is regarded as attribute-based group signature. However, the details of how AnonySense protects identities of queriers and collectors are not explicitly specified [22] . Moreover, the location information of collectors is still exposed [7] , which is not desirable. We therefore propose a region-based group signature by blurring location information based on the region concept to achieve collector anonymity. In particular, we leverage logic partition of cellular radio access network, region, which consists of several neighboring base stations (BSs). MUs located in the coverage area of BSs belonging to the same region are considered in the same group for group signature. In this case, the identities of the MUs in the same group are indistinguishable, and location privacy [6] , [10] , [12] , [14] , [17] , [18] is also preserved. This idea has been applied in VANET [23] , where vehicles are grouped according to the nearest road side unit. However, the authors did not investigate corresponding rekeying overhead and implementation feasibility of proposed region-based group signature.
This paper tries to propose a novel region-based group signature for mobile sensing considering rekeying overhead and implementation feasibility. The rekeying overhead significantly depends on size of group (i.e., the size of region). In particular, the larger coverage area under the same user density reduces the possibility of group-changing, which resulting in lower signaling overhead. However, it also causes a higher number of participants perform rekeying due to the leaving user, which subsequently incurs heavier signaling overhead. This tradeoff motivates us to conduct extensive simulation experiments for the investigation of optimal region/group size. By referring the simulation results, the operator could adjust the size of a cluster according to the density of participants for an efficient configuration. Regarding implementation feasibility, we implement Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)-based group signature on smartphone and test the realistic performance.
The contributions of this paper are listed as follows
• We combine the group signature with region concept in cellular network to make collectors located in the same region indinguishable, thereby achieving collector anonymity and location privacy.
• We propose practical protocols for region-based group signature, where how messages exchange among network entities are elaborated.
• Extensive simulation experiments are conducted to evaluate rekeying overheads due to handover among regions, which is not addressed in the current literature. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. A comprehensive comparison on the privacy-preserved mobile sensing with respect to the types of protected information is introduced in Section II. We also present the general mobile sensing infrastructure and the basic cryptography technologies. Section III describes the system model of the proposed region-based group signature. The proposed regionbased group signature functions and the corresponding security analysis are discussed in Section IV. We implement group signature on smartphones and conduct extensive simulation experiments to evaluate the performance in Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes this paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK A. MOBILE SENSING
Mobile sensing exploits the rich set of embedded sensors on smartphones as the sensor nodes and leverages the existing cellular infrastructure. As shown in Fig. 1 , the basic components of mobile sensing are described as follows.
1) Mobile user (MU). MU carrying smartphone plays the roles of both querier and data collector who respectively provide and request information. The smartphone with sensing, processing, and communication FIGURE 1. Network architecture of mobile sensing. VOLUME 6, 2018 capabilities is adopted by the human as the medium to accomplish mobile sensing. 2) Base station (BS). BS provides wireless communication for information transmission to/from MU. Typically, BSs are managed by the operator and are considered as part of infrastructure. 3) Application Server (AS). AS stores collected data, extracts features of interest from the collected data and then distributes information to queriers via the transmission paths. With mobile sensing, the sensors are carried by human and thus various kinds of contents can be retrieved as follows.
• Environmental information: typically, the sensing results of this type are beneficial for all the general public. In particular, the environmental information (such as air quality, noise, weather, road information, traffic informationetc.) is exploited to understand and improve the current environment [6] , [9] , [11] , [13] - [16] , [18] .
• Public information: it includes daily information (such as the price of product, promotions) for general public in order to improve the quality of life [6] , [14] , [15] .
• Group information: this type of sensing information is shared among friends or strangers within a social group. Social information (such as pictures, messages, videos) can facilitate the closeness among friends [4] .
• Personal information: it focuses on the information monitored personally, including his/her daily life patterns, activities (such as sport), health (such as heart rate, blood pressure), and interests [5] , [6] , [14] , [16] . Please note that individual interests receive lots of attentions recently since people want to discover the potential friends with same interests.
Please note that the behavior of mobile sensing is similar to the IoT paradigm. However, unlike traditional IoT applications where sensors collect surrounding information on a fixed location, sensors carried by participants in mobile sensing will retrieive personal information related to human activity, which introduce the concern of privacy. The existing privacy concerns for mobile sensing is summarized in the next subsection.
B. PRIVACY CONCERNS IN MOBILE SENSING
The involvement of personal information in mobile sensing might reveal the vulnerability of privacy explosion. Surveys of privacy considerations in mobile sensing are provided in [6] - [8] . If the linking between identity and its personal information is established, the privacy of the collector is violated. Consequently, current solutions try to achieve ambiguity among people or among personal information to obfuscate adversaries [22] . As shown in Table 1 , this paper classifies the privacy-preserving solutions with a novel taxonomy, which identifies the following two dimensions.
1) DOMAIN OF AMBIGUITY
The ambiguity can be achieved in different kinds of domains in personal information.
• Content-based: The identities of people who collect the same type of contents are obscured. For example, PEPSI [15] protects privacy by assigning the same key to the participants who provide the same type of contents. Moreover, in [24] , user activities are classified into different types to achieve the data ambiguity.
• Attribute-based: The identities of people with the same attribute are indistinguishable. AnonySense [9] , [11] provides a platform for the distribution of sensing tasks. The collectors could download the task and check if their attributes satisfy the requirement of the task. As a result, querier could only know the attribute of the collectors, but not their identities. In [28] , a single report needs some users to cooperate asynchronously, so the waiting time and transmission cost is obviously high.
• Region-based: The identities of people who locates in the same region are blurred, and thus location privacy is ensured. Gao et al. [14] follow the framework of [9] , however, the sensing tasks requested by the querier will be forwarded to an additional trusted third party, where the linking of querier's spatial-temporal information and their identities is broken. Mobicrowd [17] introduces a distributed solution by enforcing querier request information from the neighboring collectors. In this case, the possibility of leaking spatial-temporal information of queriers at AS is reduced. In [25] , the origin sensing information can be recovered by the cooperation of all the users in the region by performing the exclusive OR operation.
• Identity-based: Each participant is assigned an alias, which breaks the linking between the identity and privacy information. For example, in PEPPeR [13] , AS assigns each query a token, which is exploited to represent the initiator of the query so that malicious users cannot distinguish the identity of the querier.
2) TECHNIQUE FOR AMBIGUITY
The identities are obscured by following techniques:
• K-anonymity [31] : It is built on the rationale that we need to exploit a set containing K attributes to describe a specific user comprehensively. In this case, if one of these K attributes is missing, the identity of the user is indistinguishable due to the reason that the number of users with the same remaining K − 1 attributes is enormous [12] . As a result, the identity of the user is hidden. In PriSense [10] and DAPP [18] , collectors divide sensing data (including the spatial-temporal information) into K slices and only the malicious user getting all K slices can the violate the privacy of the collector.
• Identity-Based Encryption [32] , [33] : It is designed to reduce the costs of certificate management in PKI (public key infrastructure). In particular, a user sends its ID to private key generator (PKG) at trusted third party to obtain its private key. Moreover, the user could exploit other user's ID and the master public key shared by PKG to generate other user's public key for the message encryption. In PEPSI [15] , AS will assign different keys depending the type of contents to different collectors and the collectors then encrypt the collected data using the keys. In this case, we can only observe the type of information, thereby preserving privacy.
• Alias: When a querier wants to query data, he has to ask the application provider for a token. By applying the blind signature and the token, data producer is able to check if the token is valid without figuring out the querier's identity [13] . As a result, the querier's privacy is protected.
• Slot Reservation: Collectors are divided into groups and the reported message contains the sensed data from all group members [28] . In this case, the application server can only know that the reported message is sent by the group instead of individual. However this approach suffers high transmission overhead.
• Ring Signature [34] : A signer belongs to a ''ring'' can sign messages on behalf of the ring and people can only know the ring's identity but not the signer's identity, which achieves anonymity of the signer. For example, vehicles are divided into different rings according to their type [16] .
• Group Signature [20] , [21] : Similar to ring signature, group members can sign messages on behalf of the group, so that the verifier can only know the group identity but not the real identity of the signer, which achieves anonymity of the signer. Comparing with ring signature, group signature is capable of revocation, that is, the manager of a group has the privilege of opening the signature to identify signer for misbehavior prevention, which is more appropriate for mobile sensing. In AnonySense [9] , [11] , collectors are grouped according to their attributes.
• Bilinear ElGamal Cryptosystem: [30] proposed that MUs in the same region could apply same key of Bilinear ElGamal cryptosystem for data encryption, thereby achieving anonymity.
C. BILINEAR PAIRING
Bilinear pairing on ECC recently received considerable attention (such as Weil pairing [33] ) since the technique has been identified to be able to solve some problems that were previously well recognized as unsolvable. Another advantage is its less signature overhead comparing with RSA and ElGamal, which is more suitable to be applied in low-computation equipment such as the smartphone. Typically, Bilinear pairing satisfies the following characteristics: Definition 1: Admissible Bilinear Map [33] : Let G 1 and G 2 be two groups of order q for same large prime q. An admissible bilinear map,ê :
Nondegeneracy: There exist P 1 and P 2 respectively be two generators of G 1 and G 2 such thatê(P 1 , P 2 ) = 1.
3) Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to
D. GROUP SIGNATURE
In group signature schemes, group members sign messages on behalf of the group, so that the anonymity of the signer is provided. However, the anonymity can be broken by group manager in case of legal disputes. In addition, in some group signature schemes, the group manager can dynamically alter the membership of a group member by recruitment and revocation any time after the group is established. A complete group signature has the following five necessary functions:
• Setup: Group manager sets up parameters, and generates group private key and public key. The group private key is owned by the group manager to Open a signature so that the malicious user can be identified. On the other hand, the group public key can be shared with everyone who wants to Verify the validity of a signature.
• Join: Group manager communicates with the new joining member and generates the member's signature key, which is used to Sign a message. VOLUME 6, 2018
• Sign: Valid members can sign documents. A signature is generated by using signer's private key and the group public key. It is ensured that the exposure of the keys from the signature is computational infeasible
• Verify: By using the group public key, a verifier is able to tell whether the given signature is issued by a valid member of the group.
• Open: Group manager uses group private key to identify the signer of the signature.
Five security properties are supported by group signature as follows.
• Unforgeability: Only group members can sign messages on behalf of the group.
• Unlinkability: It is computationally hard to decide whether two different valid signatures are generated by the same signer.
• Anonymity: Given a valid signature of some message, identifying the actual signer is computationally hard for everyone except the group manager.
• Excludability: Neither a group member nor the group manager can sign on behalf of other group members.
• Traceability: The group manager is always able to open a valid signature and identify the actual signer.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
To preserve privacy by using region-based mobile sensing, we adjust the architecture of the traditional mobile sensing in Fig. 1 as the new one shown in Fig. 2 . The radio access network is logically partitioned into clusters and each cluster consists of several neighboring BSs. The concept of region is developed in cellular network for mobility management, such as Location Area or Region Area. In this paper, we borrow the idea of region for grouping MUs, that is, MUs located in the coverage area of BSs belonging to the same cluster are considered in the same group. For example, the cellular infrastructure in Fig. 2 is partitioned into three clusters and MUs located in the upper cluster in Fig. 2 belong to group 1. The decision of cluster is similar to the cluster head selection in wireless sensor networks and we omit the related details. A group manager maintained by a trusted third party is introduced in the proposed scheme, which stores the information of how the cellular infrastructure is partitioned (known as the regional map) [8] , [14] . As a result, the group manager will know which MUs are belong to the same group and take care of the related procedures. For example, when an MU enters the coverage area of a cluster, the group manager will perform Join procedure. To prevent the consideration that group manager located in the become a burden on the performance of the system, we can apply the recent innovation fog computing or mobile edge computing architecture [35] . In particular, the group manager with communication, computation, and storage capabilities could be moved closer to UEs and co-located with BSs, thereby reducing the delay and improving the performance [36] . Such enhancement is considered as the future work of this paper. The functionalities of a group manager are divided into the following two entities:
• Tracing Manager (TM). It serves as the authority center generating the required bilinear groups as the system parameters. Those parameters are exploited to generate the group public key gpk and user private key for every group member (denoted as gsk). Basically, we adopt Bilinear pairing to generate group signature. Let G 1 and G 2 denote two multiplicative cyclic groups with a generator g 1 and g 2 of the same prime order p, respectively. Let ψ be a computable isomorphism from G 2 to G 1 . With ψ(g 2 ) = g 1 ,ê is a computable mapê : G 1 ×G 2 → G T with the following properties.
-Bilinearity: For all u ∈ G 1 , v ∈ G 2 , and a, b ∈ Z * p , e(u, v) ab .
-Nondegeneracy:ê(g 1 , g 2 ) = g = 1 G T . Furthermore, we assume that the strong DiffieHellman (SDH) assumption holds on (G 1 , G 2 ) and that the linear DiffieHellman assumption holds on G 1 [21] . TM also maintains the regional graph containing the information of how the service region is partitioned into groups.
• Membership Manager (MM). MM is responsible for group membership control. Once an MU joins the mobile sensing, it's identity is registered on MM. Then MM will generate a private key gsk for the new coming MU by using security-related parameters shared by TM. Finally, the group public key gpk and the user private key gsk are both delivered to the MU for the signing the following document.
A. TRUST MODEL AND THREAT MODEL
Obviously, the group manager with TM and MM are assumed to be trusted since it belongs to a trusted third party. Moreover, BSs are managed by the operator and are considered as part of trusted infrastructure. We assume that MU might be malicious since the adversary could easily join the applications to obtain some benefits. Followings are the descriptions of the possible attacks launched by the adversary.
• Eavesdropping: the adversary is able to get messages which are sent through unsafe channels. In the region-based mobile sensing, the adversary can retrieve all the sensed information and corresponding group signatures since they are unencrypted. Please note that for the important parameters such as keys, RL, and LL are encrypted to prevent from being revealed.
• Key forgery: a malicious data collector could fork an illegal gsk and try to sign an signature on the sensed information for the participation of service.
• Message modification: when the adversary eavesdrops a message, he can modify some parts of message structure and then send the modified message to AS.
• Replay attack: after eavesdropping, the adversary can send a copy without modification to AS. This brings unnecessary burden to AS.
• Brute force: the adversary is able to use every possible key and tries to make the same signature as the one that matches the eavesdropped message. Table 2 summarizes the notations of security-related information exploited in the proposed region-based group signature. 
IV. REGION-BASED GROUPING MOBILE SENSING
A. MESSAGE FORMAT Fig. 3 defines the message format of mobile sensing, where Group ID is used to identify which group the participant belongs. The message may include the information on the user's position, message sending time, direction, speed, sensing information, etc. A timestamp is used to prevent the message replay attack. The collector creates a signature using the first four parts of the message and includes it in the fifth field. Finally, survival time is included, which acts the timer that controls how long the message is allowed to be stored in the AS. As a result, the old information decays, preventing the user from being inundated with information. B. FUNCTIONS   Fig. 4 briefly describes the distribution and usage of securityrelated information (such as keys and regional map) in Setup, Join, Sign, and Verify. The details of those functions are described as follows.
• Setup at TM, MM, and AS: It serves as an initialization procedure as follows. 
1) TM selects two elements
Then TM sets its private key tmsk as (ε 1 , ε 2 ) and sets private key of MM mmsk as γ . Finally, TM publishes the system parameters param and group public key gpk as follows:
Moreover, regional map is established in TM here. 2) TM sends the regional map, param, mmsk, and gpk to MM as well as sends gpk and regional map to AS.
• Join at MU and MM: In region-based group signature, MM at trusted third party shall firstly determine which group MUs should join in. However, the actual position is provided by the MU itself, and thus a mechanism to identify MU's declaration is necessary. Moreover, the legality of MU shall be determined by checking if the identity of MU exists on the Black List (BL) or the revocation list (RL). 1) When a new UE appears, MM checks if identity ID i and location information of MU i are reasonable. If it does, MM assigns the UE an appropriate group according to the regional map, and generates a tuple (A i , x i ), which represents the private key gsk i of MU i . By using γ , the MM first computes x i ← H (γ , ID i ) ∈ Z * p and sets
2) Then MM stores the pair (A i , ID i ) and sends the corresponding key pairs as well as the regional map to MU i . Please note x i will not be stored in MM since it can be computed by γ and ID i directly.
• Sign at MU: Given a message M ∈ {0, 1} * , MU i signs on M using the group public key gpk and the private key pair (A i , x i ), and details are described as follows. 
• Verify at AS: Given a group public key gpk = (g 1 , g 2 , h, u, v, w), a message M , and a signature σ i received from MU i , AS verifies if σ i is valid as follows: 1) AS computesR 1 ,R 2 ,R 3 ,R 4 , andR 5 respectively
. If yes, the verification is accepted, otherwise, the verification is rejected. 3) AS also checks if the location information provided by MU i matches its group ID. If not, AS will notify TM to perform Open to get the ID of the misbehaved MU i and TM will enforce MU i execute Leave. If MU i does not honestly initiate Leave, it will be treated as malicious, and its ID and private key will be included in BL and RL, respectively. Fig. 5 briefly describes the usage of security-related information (such as keys and regional map) in Open, Revoke, Leave, and Update. The details of those functions are described as follows.
• Open at TM: TM traces the signer of a doubtable signature by using the group public key gpk = (g 1 , g 2 , h, u, v, w), TM secret key tmsk = (ε 1 , ε 2 ), the message M , and the signature σ = (T 1 , T 2 , T 3 , c, s α , s β , s x i , s δ 1 , s δ 2 ) as follows. 
1) TM first uses gpk to verify that if
2 ). 3) After getting A i , TM can recover the identity of MU i (i.e., ID i ) from its signature σ i .
• Revoke at AS and TM: According the information updated by MU, AS might find some data are biased and then want to identify the source UE of the data. The compromised or malicious UE shall be excluded from the group and details are described as follows.
1) AS notifies TM to perform
Open to retrieve the ID and the private key of the malicious MU as well as include the ID and the private key respectively in the BL and RL. 2) If MU 1 , MU 2 , . . . , MU r in the group are needed to be revoked, TM first generates RL as RL =
, and ψ as a computable isomorphism from G 2 to G 1 , with ψ(g 2 ) = g 1 . TM then transmits RL to all legal MUs in the same group. To prevent the content of RL being overheared by revoking MUs, RL is protected by symmetric cryptography algorithm exploiting gsk j as the key.
3) The new group public key gpk new is updated at TM as (ḡ 1 ,ḡ 2 , h, u, v,w),
2 , w = (g 2 ) γ , and y = π r i=1 (γ + x i ). 4) The updates of new group public key gpk new and the private key of legal MU are performed in Update.
• Leave at MU, AS, and TM: With the regional map received in Join, an MU can identify that he is physically leaving the service area of the group when he is moving. In this case, this procedure is performed as follows.
1) The MU notifies MM the event of leaving and MM will subsequently ask TM to perform the Open function to get the ID and the private key of the leaving MU.
2) The private key will be included in the leaving list (LL) and TM will send LL to remaining group members for rekeying, and the details will be described in the following Update procedure. 3) Meanwhile, TM will generate a new group public key in the exactly same way as that in Revoke.
• Update at MU, MM, and AS: After receiving RL or LL from TM, the legal group members, MM, and AS will update respectively their key pairs locally to exclude malicious or leaving MUs from the existing group. Please note that if RL or LL contains r MUs, the following procedure will be performed for r times to ensure each legal MU gets the new key pair. 1) For each (A * i , x i ), the group public key is calculated as:
2) At the same time, the legal MU sets his new private key as (Â, x), whereÂ ← ψ(
C. THREAT MODEL
This subsection discusses the possible attacks launched by the adversary. Please note that we ignore the availability attack (i.e., denial of service attack) here.
• Information leakage: In the region-based mobile sensing, the adversary can retrieve all the sensed information and corresponding group signatures since they are unencrypted. By performing some comparison and analysis, its easy to identify the collector who sign the signature and even user's location or trajectory, which violate user's privacy severely.
• Brute force attack: the adversary is able to use every possible key and tries to make the same signature as the one that matches the eavesdropped message.
D. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In our scheme, the security properties of original group signatures are preserved; the main difference is that we reduce the anonymity level from whole system to the group region. In addition, AS, TM and MM should be trusted. In the following, the security issues in proposed region-based mobile sensing are examined as follows.
• Collector anonymity: under group signature, the collector of a certain group can sign the collected data on behalf of the entire group. In this case, even the adversary has joined the same group, he can only verify if the collected data was signed by some group member, but not the real or pseudo-identity of the collector, thereby achieving the anonymity. Only the TM who owns the tmsk can perform Open function to figure out the pseudo-identity of signer.
• Location privacy: by grouping the collectors according to the located region, the real position of the collector cannot be precisely distinguished. In this case, the adversary can only trace the position of the collectors coarsely (i.e., at the region level, which consisted of several BSs with large coverages) and thus the location privacy is protected.
• Data integrity: The sign and verify functions contain hash functions. Once the message or signature is modified, the hash value is changed so that the calculation result would not be correct. When a message is modified, by the collision resistance property of hash functions,
so that the verification is rejected. As a result, data integrity is preserved.
• Unforgeability: Assuming that the adversary acts as an unauthenticated user with param, gpk, and a forged
As a result, the signature generated by the malicious user would not be successfully verified with gpk [21] .
• Traceability: When AS finds a message which is verified to be legal containing wrong contents, AS can send it to TM to perform Open function. In this case, the identity of the signer will be found and traceability is achieved.
• Against reply attack: The timestamp is included in the message of our scheme. As a result, when AS finds a message is out-of-date, the message will be abandoned without verifying.
• Against brute force attack: Although an adversary can figure out the key of specific signature, however, in the 112-bit ECC-based group signature scheme, the key space of MU's private key contains 2 112 , or 5.19 × 10 33 possible keys. As a result, computational security is preserved in our scheme.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, performance results with respect to signaling overhead and delay of rekeying in region-based mobile sensing are investigated. Please note that among the existing region-based solutions [6] , [12] , [14] , [23] , no analysis of rekeying or key updating is provided. As the first work discussing effects of region/group size on rekeying overhead, VOLUME 6, 2018 this work also carefully examine the design of the group size.
A. IMPLEMENTATION OF GROUP SIGNATURE
The group signature is performed on smartphones with limited computation capability and battery. As a result, a practical understanding on the performance of the complicated group signature on smartphones is a necessity. This subsection therefore utilizes library [37] to implement a group of signatures on smartphones. The implementation is based on Eclipse platform, version Android 4.4.2. Two platforms, HTC ONE M7 and SAMSUNG S5, are chosen and three different bit lengths for keys of ECC, 256 bit, 160 bit and 112 bit, are implemented. The measuring results of operating time for Join, Sign, Verify, and Update are listed in Table 3 .
B. SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS
This subsection conducts extensively simulation experiments, where real data of BSs deployments are applied with the aid of OpenCellID project [38] , to comprehensively evaluate the proposed region-based grouping approach in a realistic network environment. The OpenCellID project maintains a complete and open database of BS information worldwide, and we can easily retrieve latitude and longitude information of BSs according to the target urban area. Fig. 6 shows the filtered-out BSs locations in Google Map of Taipei City. The spatial distribution of MUs is assumed to follow a homogeneous Poisson Point Process (PPP) with density N u , where PPP is a good candidate to be applied as an approach to model the location of MUs since its randomness and tractability [39] . We assume that each MU is associated with the closest BS. We group N g neighboring BSs as one cluster and randomly choose one BS as the group manager of the cluster. The movements of MUs are modeled using [40] , where the movement trace can be described by an infinite sequence {X 0 , X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n }. If X n−1 is the current waypoint, the node chooses a transition angle θ and transition length L following the cumulative distribution function P(L ≤ l) = 1 − exp(ηπl 2 ), l ≥ 0, where η is a mobility parameter. From the definition in [40] , a smaller η indicates a larger mean value of the transition length. Specifically, the transition length is Rayleigh distributed with the mean value 1/(2 √ η). Please note that the selection of the transition angle and the transition length in each movement is independent and identical. Each time an MU moves, we simply assume that ρ × 100 of MUs are malicious and thus will be excluded from the current group, which subsequently incurs rekeying. The details of parameter setup and corresponding notations are listed in Table 4 . Please note that here we refer to the operating time of SAMSUNG S5. 
C. PERFORMANCE METRICS
The overhead of the proposed mechanism is caused by the rekeying, which is also the primary concern in the simulation experiments. Typically, rekeying for an MU occurs in the following two cases
• Join. Everytime an MU joins a new group, the MU will retrieve the group public key of this group and its corresponding private key. Join includes one message sent from MU to MM and one reply sent from MM to MU. The reply message contains gpk and gsk of total size 224 bits.
• Update. Typically, it is triggered by Leave or Revoke.
More specifically, when an MU physically leaves the current group service area or is regarded as malicious, all the remaining group members will rekey to ensure forward security. In these cases, LL or RL is unicasted to each legal MU for the local key update. For each legitimate remaining user in the group, one signaling message is needed to include LL or RL, and the size of LL or RL respectively depends on the number of revoking or leaving users times the size of key (i.e., 112 bits).
Followings are the details of the considered performance metrics.
1) The average number of rekeyings (denoted as N r ). The region-based mobile sensing introduces the key update due to mobility, i.e., leaving user. Our simulation experiment therefore shall investigate the effects of mobility on the increase of rekeyings.
2) The average waiting time for rekeying at MUs (denoted as W r ): For the portable device with limited computing power, the introduction of ECC with complicated computation complexity on group signature might incur long computation time, which degrades quality of service. As a result, the average waiting time for rekeying at MU is considered as an important performance metric.
3) The average number of signaling messages for rekeying (denoted as C r ). We are also interested in the average number of signaling messages communicated between MUs and group manager under the operations of group signature for rekeying. 4) The average number of all signaling messages for rekeying and signing (denoted as C). Except C r due to Join and Update, signaling messages for Sign (i.e., reporting) are also included. 5) The average size of signaling messages for rekeying (denoted as S r ). To evaluate the communication cost of signaling messages more precisely, the size of the signaling message is considered as a metric. In particular, we only consider the size of keys in a signaling message since it dominates the size of a signaling message. 6) The optimal number of group managers (denoted as N * g ). Apparently, when the coverage area of groups is smaller, the users might join a new group in a higher frequency, which introduces larger signaling overhead or consumes much more time. When the coverage of group is larger, more participants need to update the public key due to others' leaving. Under the tradeoff, an optimal value of N g can be found. the service area of the current group, and thus N r becomes small. We also observe that N r firstly significantly decreases with the growth of N g , and then slightly increases. That is because the lower N g results in larger group coverage, reduces the possibility of execution of Join and Leave. However, when the group size reaches some threshold, the number of MUs who perform Update due to a leaving user in the same group is not negligible. Thus, the smaller of N g degrades the system performance. In summary, the effects of Update from remaining MUs in a group dominate as N g is small while the effects of frequent Join and Leave dominate as N g is large. Under the tradeoff, an optimal value of N g can be found. We also found an interesting result that as η decreases, N * g decreases. This observation can serve as the guideline for designing the number of groups under the existence of tradeoff. Fig. 8 , the curve of W r keeps similar trend as in Fig. 7 . However, as shown in Table 4 , the operating FIGURE 8. Average waiting time of participants for rekeying under the effects of N g and η, where ρ = 0.01, N g = 10 to 200, η = 6000, 9000, 12000, 15000, 20000, and N m = 1000. The optimal numbers of group managers is presented by using solid marks. VOLUME 6, 2018 time of Join is much longer than that of Update. As a result, the effects of frequent Join and Leave dominate that of Update from remaining MUs, which leads the observation that as N g increases, W r slightly decreases and significantly increases. The optimal number of group N * g for W r is therefore smaller than that for N r .
2) EFFECTS OF
3) EFFECTS OF N g AND η ON C r Fig. 9 plots C r as functions of N g and η, where ρ = 0.01, N g = 10 to 200, η = 6000, 9000, 12000, 15000, 20000, and N m = 1000. The phenomenon found in this figure is similar to that in Fig. 7 . It is not difficult to notice that Join always takes two signaling messages while Update only takes one. As a result, the as N g increase, the effects of Join become apparent, and C r increases more significantly. Fig. 10 plots S r as functions of N g and η, where ρ = 0.01, N g = 10 to 200, η = 6000, 9000, 12000, 15000, 20000, and N m = 1000. We know that the signaling size for Update depends on the total number of malicious or leaving MUs, and is much larger than that of Join (i.e., fixed 224 bits). In this case, we suggest that each BS is considered as a single group. Even under such deployment, MUs will change the group in extremely high frequency, the overhead of signaling size caused by Join is much smaller than that caused by Update. Fig. 11 plots C r as functions of N g and ρ, where ρ = 0, 0.01, 0.03, 0.05, 0.1, N g = 10 to 200, η = 9000, and N m = 1000. This figure examines the impact of rekeying due to malicious users (i.e., Revoke) on the average number of signaling messages. When ρ becomes larger, the number of malicious MUs becomes larger, and the number of times that Update will be performed due to Revoke becomes larger. As N g becomes smaller, each group contains more members, and the influence of a single Revoke becomes more significant. obvious that the tolerance of the changing ρ of region-based grouping is much higher. The reason is that with the regionbased grouping, the influence of each Revoke decreases from whole system to one region. Fig. 13 plots C as function of I r with region-based K-anonymity and group signature schemes, where ρ = 0.01, N g = 50, η = 12000, N m = 1000, and λ = 10 to 30. With group signature, the sensed data can be sent from collectors to AS directly while in K-anonymity scheme [6] , [12] , [14] , the sensed the data is sent to the report server for ambiguity. As shown in this figure, considering all signaling messages (including that from Sign, Join, and Update), group signature outperforms K-anonymity significantly. The simulation result provide a good reference to estimate how large of a group region can be with different application scenarios and scale of users to maintain the required performance.
4) EFFECTS OF N g AND η ON S r

5) EFFECTS OF N g AND ρ ON C r
7) EFFECTS OF λI r ON C OF REGION-BASED K-ANONYMITY AND GROUP SIGNATURE SCHEMES
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a novel region-based group signature for mobile sensing to protect the privacy of information retrieved from MUs in the same region. In particular, MUs located in the same region can sign messages on behalf of the group, and the verifier can only know the group identity but not the real identity of the signer, which achieves anonymity of the signer and further preserves location privacy. The introduction of regional key management facilitates the reduction of rekeying overheads due to the leaving from the current region. A comprehensive security analysis is provided for the proposed scheme to prevent additional vulnerabilities revealed. By implementing ECC-based group signature on smartphones, the computational delay for operations in the proposed group signature is evaluated. We also conduct an extensive simulation experiment to investigate the performance of proposed region-based grouping approach with the real BS deployments in Taipei from the perspectives of signaling overhead and delay. Our simulation shows that by appropriately adjusting the number of clusters, the signaling overhead can be minimized, which offers insight on designing an efficient and anonymous mobile sensing as well as encourages the participation.
